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Abstract
Electricity markets are currently going through a phase of agitating tran-
sition, which is mainly characterized by an increasing share of fluctuating
renewable energies. Among policy makers, this has led to growing concerns
about generation adequacy and often to the introduction of different capac-
ity remuneration mechanisms to generate less volatile sources of income for
investors and, thereby, guaranteeing generation adequacy. However, these
mechanisms entail new challenges regarding the best design to avoid any
adverse effects. At the same time, it is disputed whether capacity remu-
neration mechanisms are indeed needed or whether an energy-only market
is sufficient. Therefore, after discussing the peculiarities of the electricity
markets, which are the starting point of the unique regulatory framework,
an up-to-date overview of the debate on the need for capacity remuneration
mechanisms is provided. In addition, the current status of capacity remu-
neration mechanisms in Europe is shown, and initial experience is presented.
Furthermore, this article reflects the current state of research about capacity
remuneration mechanisms in regards to, for example, cross-border effects,
investment cycles or market power. In a conclusive summary, shortcomings
of the existing research works and open questions that need to be addressed
in future works are discussed.
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1. Introduction
A reliable electricity system remains one of the main objectives of energy
market regulators, especially after liberalizing the sector, whereas market
participants are now responsible for investments in supply capacities. This
objective requires the stimulation of adequate investments on the supply side
by market prices, which are to be high enough to finance not only the opera-
tional but also the fixed costs. However, as experienced in Europe, generating
adequate price signals becomes more and more challenging during the energy
transition phase, which is mainly shaped by three factors: the expansion of
renewable energies, the reduction of carbon emissions from fossil power pro-
duction and the European market integration. In this transition period,
electricity prices have strongly decreased. Besides other factors, the rising
feed-in from volatile renewable energy sources (RES) with marginal genera-
tion costs near zero has strongly contributed to this development (Kallabis
et al., 2016; Bublitz et al., 2017).
Furthermore, a reliable electricity system needs to be reached at rea-
sonable costs for end consumers while at the same time greenhouse gases
and other emissions are limited to a certain level. These three targets of
electricity market regulation—reliability, sustainability, and affordability—
are commonly named the energy trilemma (Ang et al., 2015; Hawker et al.,
2017), as an efficient balance between these oftentimes conflicting targets
is difficult to find and achievable only by accepting trade-offs. However,
in practice it looks as if reliability is the trump card in the debate, where
the objective is to maintain the high level of security of supply reached in
industrialized economies without restrictions (European Commission, 2006;
BMWi, 2017), leaving the relative weights given to sustainability and afford-
ability the only thing that remains to be decided (Newbery, 2016b). The
challenging trade-off between reaching the set targets of sustainability and
affordability is usually made by pricing emissions through dedicated cap and
trade schemes, such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.
Initially, several exchanges and pool markets were established, on which
especially energy quantities were traded forming the energy-only market
(EOM). The short-term objective of the EOM is to allocate resources op-
timally (e.g., Gan and Litvinov, 2003) and to ensure a cost-minimal supply
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with prices reflecting marginal costs of electricity production, whereas its task
in the long-term is to guarantee the demand-supply adequacy by generating
investment signals provided by peaking prices at scarcity times (Stoft, 2002;
Hogan, 2005). However, motivated by the missing money problem, there is
still an ongoing discussion about the ability of the EOM to fulfill these ob-
jectives in general (Cramton et al., 2013; Joskow, 2008). In the recent years,
the discussion became even stronger due to the expansion of RES electricity
generation (Hildmann et al., 2015).
Due to the already large and still quickly growing number of studies on ca-
pacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs)1, it is increasingly hard to keep an
up-to-date overview. As several real-world experiences in the implementation
and administration of CRMs have been gained, reviews have already been
carried out focusing on the practical lessons learned (e.g., Batlle and Rodilla,
2010; Beckers et al., 2012; Bhagwat et al., 2016b; Karacsonyi et al., 2006;
Spees et al., 2013). However, due to the rapid development and frequent reg-
ulatory changes, some of the presented information is already obsolete. Other
more broadly oriented studies provide a systematic description of CRMs as
well as a descriptive comparison (e.g., Doorman et al., 2016; DNV GL, 2014;
European Commission, 2016b; Hancher et al., 2015; de Vries, 2007) or fo-
cus on the fundamental economic principles of CRMs, (e.g., Cramton et al.,
2013; Stoft, 2002). Beside these review documents on theoretical concepts of
market design and CRMs as wells as a review of mechanisms implemented
in some countries, to the knowledge of the authors, there still does not ex-
ist any comprehensive review on the discussion about and the assessment of
different design options for the electricity market in the literature.
Hence, this article aims to guide newcomers and interested researchers
through the complex field of electricity market design by providing a broad
and up-to-date survey starting with the discussion about the necessity of
alternatives to the EOM (Section 2). Afterward, the focus is set on the as-
sessment of market design options in the literature, both from a practical
perspective and theoretical perspective. In the practical case, implemented
market design options in different European countries (Section 3) are dis-
cussed, as many changes to existing market designs could be observed in
1In the literature, two other terms—capacity mechanism and capacity markets—are
commonly used as synonyms for capacity remuneration mechanisms. In this article, how-
ever, capacity markets have a narrower definition and are considered as a specific variant
of the different mechanism to enumerate capacity (see 3).
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Europe in the last years. The theoretical perspective considers the assess-
ment of the impacts of different design options (Section 4) on regulatory
targets, such as generation adequacy and RES integration. The review of
the latter perspective will be carried out in focusing on the qualitative dis-
cussion of limitations and benefits of each market design option, as well as
on the model-based analysis of impacts on different criteria, e.g., market wel-
fare, security of supply or incentivizing flexibility. Finally, the main common
findings are discussed, open questions with which researchers are currently
confronted are pointed out, and a set of policy implications is derived (Section
5).
2. The on-going debate about securing
generation adequacy
The electricity sector is characterized by a particular set of features dis-
tinguishing it from other sectors often viewed as unique and problematic
as these features act as barriers complicating the formation of an efficient
market equilibrium between demand and supply in the short term and, even
more so, in the long term (Borenstein, 2002; Joskow and Tirole, 2007). These
barriers mainly originate from the physical properties of the electricity sys-
tem as well as specific market properties and have raised growing concerns
regarding generation adequacy2.
In the recent years, especially European policymakers are worried whether
the existing markets will generate sufficient price signals to incentivize in-
vestments in generation capacity and to ensure security of supply (Léautier,
2016). However, the question remains whether these concerns are justified
and if the already introduced instruments are effective and efficient. There-
fore, after describing the long-standing barriers (Section 2.1) and more recent
challenges (Section 2.2) that lead to numerous adaptations of the existing
market design, the current state of the debate on market design is presented
(Section 2.3).
2Generation adequacy has a long-term orientation and is defined as the ability of an
electricity system to provide sufficient capacities to satisfy the base as well as the peak
demand at all times (European Commission, 2017a). Furthermore, generation adequacy
also includes the ability to provide sufficient flexibility to follow sharp load changes (Brijs
et al., 2016).
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2.1. Existing barriers to generation adequacy
The barriers in the electricity sector can be clustered in physical and
market-related ones. Physical barriers are mainly based on the fact that
electricity systems need to balance generation and consumption in each node
of the electricity grid at every point in time, as the disruption of electricity
frequency can lead to severe damages, such as the destruction of connected
devices or even the collapse of the entire power system (Kwoka and Madjarov,
2007). Usually, the most substantial amount of electricity is already traded
several months or years in advance via forward contracts and over-the-counter
(OTC) markets that allow energy suppliers to hedge their portfolio (Meeus
et al., 2005). As the possibilities to store electricity economically are still
limited, and deviations from the expected consumer demand as well as the
unexpected unavailability of generation capacity induce a need for short-
term trading, spot markets usually possess high liquidity. However, as a
certain time between spot market clearing and fulfillment is still necessary to
organize the delivery, current wholesale markets are unable to capture these
temporal and spatial requirements in their clearing process. Hence, other
market or regulatory mechanisms are required. Furthermore, due to the
nature of the electricity network, a free-rider problem occurs as up to now the
network cannot differentiate between customers with and without contracts
guaranteeing a reliable supply (Lynch and Devine, 2017). Therefore, an EOM
design without reliability contracts cannot discriminate between customers
who are willing to pay for reliability and those who are not (Joskow and
Tirole, 2007). These technical properties are one reason why electricity prices
as the outcome of market equilibrium cannot carry all information and signals
necessary for the reliable long-term operation and the required investments
in the generation infrastructure. Other reasons, which are briefly discussed
in the following, stem from the market organization itself.
One problem in current wholesale electricity markets is that large parts
of electricity demand are inelastic from a short-term perspective, e.g., house-
holds have a fixed rate for energy consumption in combination with a base
rate tariff (Dütschke and Paetz, 2013) and, thus, do not actively participate
in the volatile wholesale market or show any reaction even to drastic prices
changes (Cramton and Stoft, 2005). Therefore, the marginal costs of base
load and with increasing demand peak load power plants set the market
price until the entire demand can no longer be met by the existing gener-




















Figure 1: Price setting in scarcity situations. a) The equilibrium price p∗ is below the
price cap p̄ and an efficient outcome is achieved. b) The equilibrium price p∗ is above the
price cap p̄, however, as the resulting price p∗ is equal to the price cap, welfare loses occur
(missing money).
state that the price signal for reliable supply and generation adequacy can
be considered weak. Keppler (2017) even argues that many problems regard-
ing security of supply could be solved if the demand side became more elastic
and participated in the market efficiently. Furthermore, Aalami et al. (2010)
claim that the implementation of demand response programs will lead to the
reflection of wholesale prices in retail prices, especially, if new developments
change the need for electric services and new business models are developed
for the demand response measures. However, currently, the main burden of
balancing the system to guarantee the reliable operation of the electricity
grid in the short term and to ensure generation adequacy in the long term
lies on the supply side.
6
Price caps in spot markets3 are a regulatory barrier introduced to protect
consumers and to avoid the abuse of market power in the absence of demand
elasticity (Stoft, 2002). However, as Petitet et al. (2017) point out, price caps
are usually set below the value of lost load (VoLL)4 for political reasons, and
the resulting investments in generation capacity are likely not sufficient to
cover the electricity demand at all times. Even though it is theoretically
possible to set shortage prices or price caps sufficiently high, i.e., equal to
the VoLL, in practice its specific value would have to be determined first—a
task often described as difficult or even impossible to perform (e.g., Cramton
et al., 2013; Willis and Garrod, 1997).
Therefore, other measures may be required to replace signals coming from
price spikes and to generate sufficient incentives for investments (Doorman
et al., 2016). These additional measures are to be implemented to address
the so-called missing money problem, which can be defined as the lost earn-
ings beyond the price cap, especially for peak load power plants (see Figure
1b). More detailed, missing money is that part of these lost earnings that is
necessary to cover the investment and all other fixed costs. For Joskow and
Tirole (2007), missing money may also occur due to premature technical de-
cisions of system operators to avoid market disequilibrium and brownouts5.
Furthermore, Newbery (2016a) argues that even if earnings from price spikes
are sufficient to cover fixed and capital costs, investors might not be willing
to bear the associated risks and are unable to lay them off through futures
and contract markets. In this case, the problem is referred to as missing
3Whereas in some countries price caps are set directly by the regulator and are legally
binding, e.g., Texas ERCOT day-ahead market 9000 USD/MWh (Public Utility Commis-
sion of Texas [PUC], 2012), in other countries only a technical limit exists. For example,
the limit for the French day-ahead market at the EPEX SPOT is 3000 EUR/MWh (EPEX
SPOT, 2018), and for the Spanish daily market at the OMIE the limit is 180 EUR/MWh
(OMI-Polo Español [OMIE], 2018). However, for over-the-counter trading, a higher price
can be specified.
4The value of lost load describes the average willingness of customers to pay for the
reliability of their electricity supply. The individual willingness to pay is not an unlimited
value but can vary between close to zero and tens of thousands of Euros per MWh,
especially for critical infrastructures such as hospitals (Hogan, 2017).
5 In the electricity system major failures result in brownouts or blackouts. A blackout
is a disruption in a wider range of an electricity system up to a total collapse of the
whole supply whereas a brownout implies an excessively reduced voltage that can result
in equipment failure, e.g., overheating of electric motors (Blume, 2007).
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market instead of missing money (Newbery, 1989).
2.2. Recently emerging challenges
In addition to the already mentioned long-standing barriers that exist on
wholesale electricity markets, several recent developments revive the debate
about mechanisms remunerating generation capacity, e.g., the rise of inter-
mittent RES or the market-related and political uncertainties, such as the
phase-out of specific technologies. The aim of the following paragraphs is,
thus, to shed light on these developments.
Driven by the introduction of various subsidy programs, RES have expe-
rienced a remarkable rise6. Based on the regionally varying policy targets, for
example, the ambitious EU-wide target of attaining a share of 20% renewable
energy in the final energy consumption by 2020, a further expansion of PV
and wind power capacities is expected. PV and wind power are highly capital
intensive (e.g., Newbery, 2016b; Schmidt, 2014) but feature marginal costs
close to zero (Milligan et al., 2016; Osorio and van Ackere, 2016). The low
generation costs of RES result in decreasing electricity prices—also known as
the merit-order effect (Sensfuß et al., 2008). Lower electricity prices in turn
reduce the yields of conventional generation and, at the same time, the larger
share of RES decreases the load factors of thermal capacities. Combined with
the priority dispatch of RES implemented in many European countries (Hu
et al., 2017; Newbery et al., 2017), this effect can even lead to negative prices
(Nicolosi, 2010). Furthermore, as scarcity situations occur less often, renew-
able generation reduces the profitability of peak-load plants that depend on
recovering their capital costs during a limited number of hours (Keppler,
2017). In Europe, the expansion of RES in combination with several other
factors, e.g., decreasing prices for hard coal and carbon emission certificates,
caused a significant drop in electricity prices (see Bublitz et al., 2017; Hirth,
2018; Kallabis et al., 2016) that drastically complicated the recovering of op-
erating expenses for conventional capacities (see Figure 2). For instance, in
the last years, gas-fired generation was often unprofitable. As a consequence
gas power plants are being mothballed and decommissions are already carried
6The rise of RES is, for example, illustrated by the fact that between 2006 and 2016,
the worldwide installed photovoltaic (PV) and wind power capacity grew by a compound
annual rate of 48% respectively 21% to a worldwide installed capacity of 303 GW respec-























































































































Figure 2: The development of day-ahead prices in major European markets in the last
years shows a clear downward trend, apart from the years 2009 and 2010, which can be
regarded as outliers due to the impact of the global economic crisis. The comparison of the
figures for 2008 and 2016 indicates a decline of about 50% in Germany, France, and Italy,
whereas the decline in Spain is about 33%. Sources: ENTSO-E (2017); EPEX SPOT
(2018); Gestore dei Mercati Energetic (2017); OMI-Polo Español S.A. (2017).
out or being considered (S&P Global Platts, 2013; Bloomberg, 2015; Réseau
de transport d’électricité, 2014b).
Due to the dependence on weather conditions, the generation of PV and
wind power is highly intermittent, and especially wind generation is hard to
predict (Newbery, 2016b). As their level of electricity generation is semi-
dispatchable— only a reduction is possible (Lynch and Devine, 2017; Di
Cosmo and Lynch, 2016), an additional need for flexibility is created, which,
for example, can be provided by demand response measures, large-scale stor-
age capacities or power plants with the ability to quickly ramp up or down
(Pollitt and Anaya, 2016; Cepeda and Finon, 2013). Therefore, without
further advancements, intermittent RES are currently unable to replace dis-
patchable conventional power plants adequately (Hach et al., 2016; Doorman
et al., 2016) and the need for dispatchable generation capacity remains high
(VDE, 2012). Moreover, as RES are often located away from the demand
centers and the locations of capacities they replace, grid constraints will play
a more pronounced role. RES are already mentioned as the main driver for
grid congestions (Bruninx et al., 2013), and in the future, supply and de-










































































Figure 3: Operating years since the beginning of operation of installed conventional ca-
pacities. While large capacities in Germany and France are operating for more than 30
years, in Italy and Spain, the installed capacity of the power plant fleet in the category
10–20 years is higher than the installed capacity in the category of more than 30 operating
years.
the national or supranational level. Owing to the aging power plant fleet
(see Figure 3), there does not only seem to be a need for maintaining current
conventional capacities but also to invest into new units as a large share of
the existing units reaches the limits of their technical lifetime.
Finally, investors face different uncertainties regarding fuel and electric-
ity prices and the regulatory framework, e.g., the nuclear phase-out decision,
fossil fuel reduction or carbon emission targets. Whereas the nuclear phase-
out contradicts the targets of lowering the carbon emissions, the discussions
about a phase-out of hard coal and lignite-fired power plants are in accor-
dance (e.g., Knopf et al., 2014; Bruninx et al., 2013). Even though the phase-
outs affect supply security, Becker et al. (2016) claim that neither politicians
nor scientists discuss lowering the level of security of supply to achieve a
sustainable and affordable system. Beyond that, in case of an investment
decision, the prompt commissioning of generation capacity—especially for
controversial technologies (e.g., carbon capture and storage)—proves to be
another obstacle, as the licensing process is tedious and adds another layer
of uncertainty (Doorman et al., 2016). In conclusion, it can be said that
investors are exposed to major uncertainties as a result of the described de-
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velopments, which are further exacerbated, e.g., by volatile energy prices, the
growth of e-mobility and the transfer of clean electricity into other sectors
(sector coupling). Hence, the question arises whether the required invest-
ments in conventional capacities can be handled within the existing market
design under the present uncertainties.
2.3. The optimal functioning of energy-only markets
and the necessity of capacity remuneration
mechanisms
The scientific discussion on the necessity as well as the design of CRMs
arose in the 1990s, a decade that marks the beginning of the restructuring7 of
electricity markets in many countries around the world (e.g., Hogan, 2002),
where the first approach chosen often was to rely on the scarcity pricing
of energy and, thus, EOMs were established (Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger,
2006).
One, maybe the most persuasive, argument in favor of an EOM is that—
even in the absence of an active demand response—resulting market prices
are efficient and, thus, lead to sufficient long-term investments guaranteeing
the least-cost long-term system if several key assumptions are met (Carama-
nis et al., 1982; Oren, 2005; Schweppe et al., 1988; Stoft, 2002): (1) the market
is perfectly competitive, (2) market participants have rational expectations
and (3) follow a risk-neutral strategy. However, in the light of the present
state of electricity markets that feature several imperfections (Cepeda and Fi-
non, 2011), these assumptions seem rather unrealistic, maybe even impossible
to realize in practice. In real-world markets, a small number of producers of-
ten dominate the market, resulting in a duopoly or oligopoly (e.g., Schwenen,
2014), and invest strategically (Grimm and Zöttl, 2013; Zöttl, 2010). Further-
more, investors are usually rather risk-averse, i.e., building less capacity than
risk-neutral investors would (Neuhoff and de Vries, 2004). Moreover, market
participants may not always have rational expectations, and in the presence
of the large uncertainties, e.g., about the development of electricity prices,
and the long lead times for new investments, electricity markets are prone
7In this context, in comparison with deregulation, restructuring is the better fitting
term as the electricity sector serves as a prominent example, where the replacement of a
monopoly with competitive market structures does not lead to less extensive, only to a
different regulatory framework (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; Newbery, 2005; Vogel, 1998).
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to suffer investment cycles (Arango and Larsen, 2011; Ford, 2002; Olsina
et al., 2006). The alternation between overcapacity and under-capacity re-
sults in inefficient market allocations, i.e., in the former case, unprofitable
investments and, in the latter case, an excessive risk of load curtailment and
high costs for consumers (Réseau de transport d’électricité, 2014a). More-
over, de Vries and Hakvoort (2004) argues that even long-term contracts do
not provide a solution as they offer consumers the opportunity to free-ride.8
In addition, Keppler (2017) shows two other independent problems of an
EOM. On the one hand, demand-side externalities in the form of transaction
costs and incomplete information ensure that the social willingness-to-pay
is greater than private willingness-to-pay for additional capacity. On the
other hand, investments in generation capacities are not arbitrarily scalable,
but rather take discrete values. In combination with dramatically lower rev-
enues in the transition from under to overinvestment, investors have strong
asymmetric incentives and, thus, tend to under- rather than to overinvest.
Besides, Joskow and Tirole (2007) argue that scarcity rents are very sensi-
tive to regulatory changes and that even minor mistakes are likely to have a
significant impact on market prices.
Some of the more critical voices stress that market imperfections, espe-
cially the lack of demand response, will always persist in EOMs, and lead
to the exercise of market power, which results in high price peaks. Thus, a
different framework or additional measures, e.g., CRMs, are required to help
to ensure generation adequacy efficiently (Cramton and Stoft, 2005; Joskow
and Tirole, 2007). Others reply that the main problem of EOMs is the lack
8A problem with long-term contracts is that they are not contracted directly between
consumers and utilities, but rather through load-serving entities as intermediaries. How-
ever, rational consumers prefer the cheapest retailer, which by avoiding long-term contracts
does not contribute to the financing of peaking capacities.
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of political will to allow for unconstrained electricity prices9 and periodic
shortages (Besser et al., 2002; Hogan, 2005).
However, often it is argued that CRM are inefficient and according to
Oren (2000) the least desirable instrument or according to Hogan (2017)
only the third best option to ensuring reliability—with the first option being
the elimination of the leading underlying causes, e.g., incentivize a flexible
demand10, and the second-best option being an administrative price curve for
the usage of reserve energy. Wolak (2004) even claims that the rationale for
CRM is essentially a holdover from the regulated regime of the energy sector
that encourages over-investment and is highly susceptible to market power,
thus, frequently requiring regulatory intervention to set a non-distorted ca-
pacity price.
Summing up, whether the EOM is able to guarantee generation adequacy
is still discussed intensively. It is, however, apparent that the efficient alloca-
tion of resources by an EOM is a highly challenging task, given the particular
combination of the unusual characteristics of the electricity market, i.e., the
physical properties of the product electricity, the required high level of se-
curity of supply, the lack of reactivity to real-time prices, and the missing
possibility of individual consumer rationing (Joskow and Tirole, 2007). More-
over, the utilization of real-world experience to draw general conclusions is
only of limited use. In case, some analysts argue that the developments on
a particular market serve as an example for the inherent shortcomings of
an EOM, advocates respond that the market has not been able to function
9Although price caps are frequently mentioned as a source of the missing money prob-
lem, the data on market prices do seem to tell a different story, e.g., since the establishment
of the EEX in 2000, the upper price limit of the German spot market (3000 EUR/MWh)
was not once hindering the price formation (EPEX SPOT, 2018), the same seems to be
the case in several US market areas from 2000 to 2006 (Joskow, 2008), and, thus, it seems
rather far-fetched that in the cases price caps are the primary cause of the missing money
problem. On the contrary, in France, the price cap has been hit several times, most recently
on 19 October 2009, although, the main reason arguably lies in a coordination failure, i.e.,
a difference of 7000 MW between the consumption and available capacity forecasts re-
sulting in less available capacity on the market (French Energy Regulatory Commission,
2009).
10In the future, if end consumers start to participate directly in the market via smart
meters, they could specify in detail what price they are willing to pay for each consumption
level. If the price is too high, the smart meter will switch off individual consumers directly,
for example, the washing machine, while leaving others connected, e.g., the lights and
refrigerator. Thereby, the missing money problem could be avoided (Newbery, 2016a).
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well due to regulatory mistakes (Doorman et al., 2016). Beyond that, Hogan
(2017) states that the financial distress present in many European as well
as North American electricity markets, can be attributed to over-capacities.
Even though no agreement is found in the literature on the fundamental need
for CRM, recent developments have to such an extent cast doubt on the effec-
tiveness of an EOM that in many countries politicians deem the introduction
of such mechanisms necessary.
3. Market design options and current status
of implementation in Europe
In this section, an overview of several CRMs currently implemented or
in the planning stage in European countries is presented. After briefly in-
troducing a general classification and the basic principles of different generic
mechanisms, further details of the real-world examples in some of the most
relevant European countries are described. Based on the presented findings,
conclusions from the implemented mechanisms are drawn with a focus on the
ongoing efforts of creating a single European electricity market.
3.1. Generic market design options
Typically, CRMs are designed to incentivize investments and thus im-
prove generation adequacy, i.e., avoid shortage situations. This is imple-
mented by offering capacity providers income on top of the earnings from
selling electricity on the market (Hawker et al., 2017). Yet, the mechanisms
vary in the way the required quantities that are supplied and the correspond-
ing capacity prices are determined (Hach et al., 2016).
The European Commission (2016b) distinguishes between volume-based
mechanisms, where a specific capacity sufficient to guarantee the desired
level of generation adequacy is set and then results in a market-driven price,
and price-based mechanisms, where the amount of the procured capacity is
steered by setting a target price. Both categories can also be subdivided into
market-wide and targeted approaches. Whereas market-wide mechanisms
provide support to all capacity in the market, targeted mechanisms aim at
supporting only a subset, e.g., newly built capacity or capacity expected to
be required additionally to the one already provided by the market. More
specifically, six different types of mechanisms can be differentiated (for typical
characteristics, see Table 1):
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(1) Tender for new capacity. Financial support is granted to capacity
providers in order to establish the required additional capacity. Different
variations are possible, e.g., financing the construction of new capacity or
long-term power purchase agreements.
(2) Strategic reserve. A certain amount of additional capacity is con-
tracted and held in reserve outside the EOM. The reserve capacity is only
operated if specific conditions are met, e.g., a shortage of capacity in the spot
market or a price settlement above a certain electricity price.
(3) Targeted capacity payment. A central body sets a fixed price paid only
to eligible capacity, e.g., selected technology types or newly built capacity.
(4) Central buyer. The total amount of required capacity is set by a cen-
tral body and procured through a central bidding process so that the market
determines the price. Two common variants of the central buyer mechanism
include the forward capacity market (Cramton and Stoft, 2005, 2006) and
reliability options (Perez-Arriaga, 1999; Vázquez et al., 2001; Batlle et al.,
2007).
(5) De-central obligation. An obligation is placed on load-serving entities
to individually secure the total capacity they need to meet their consumers’
demand. In contrast to the central buyer model, there is no central bid-
ding process. Instead, individual contracts between electricity suppliers and
capacity providers are negotiated.
(6) Market-wide capacity payment. Based on estimates of the level of
capacity payments needed to bring forward the required capacity, a capacity
price is determined centrally, which is then paid to all capacity providers in
the market.
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Table 1: Typical characteristics for different types of CRMs. However, due to specific requirements, the concrete specifications



































































3.2. Current status of implementation
In the European Union, the member states themselves decide on whether,
when, which and how to implement a CRM (Bhagwat et al., 2017c). Al-
though according to Petitet et al. (2017), the EOM remains the European
Commission’s preferred approach to trigger new investments and provide sig-
nals for decommissioning in case of overcapacities, several European coun-
tries have either already implemented CRMs or are currently in the process
of evaluating tailored solutions (for an overview see Table 3). The country-
specific approaches differ not only with regard to the chosen type of the
mechanism but also with regard to the respective administrators and the eli-
gible technologies. Further characteristics of the currently active mechanisms
are described in the following paragraphs.
17
Table 3: Overview of implemented CRMs in Europe. Sources: Cejie (2015); Deutscher Bundestag (2016); EirGrid plc and
SONI Limited (2017); European Commission (2014, 2016a,b,c, 2017c,b); Hancher et al. (2015); Patrian (2017); Roques et al.
(2017); Single Electricity Market Committee (2016); Svenska Kraftnät (2016).
Type Country Administrator Eligible technologies Status1
TSO RA TPP IRE DSM IC
Strategic
reserve
Belgium x x x x active (2014)
Germany x x x x planned2 (2018)
Sweden x x x active (2003)
Central
buyer
Ireland3 x x x x x x planned (2017)
Italy3 x x x x x planned (2018)
Poland4 x x x x x x planned (2018)
UK x x x x x x active (2014)
De-central
obligation




Spain5 x x active (2007)
Abbreviations: DSM—demand side management, IC—interconnector, IRE—intermittent renewable energies, RA—regulatory
authority, TPP—thermal power plant, TSO—transmission system operator
1 Year of (planned) implementation in parentheses. 2 In Germany, two separate mechanisms have been discussed that can be
classified as a strategic reserve. In 2016, a security stand-by arrangement for lignite-fired power plants with a total capacity of
2.70 GW was introduced in order to attain national climate targets. Furthermore, an additional so-called capacity reserve is
supposed to be active in winter of 2018/19 to ensure generation adequacy. However, as the European Commission still assesses
whether the capacity reserve complies with EU state aid rules, it is unclear whether the planned schedule can be met.
3 To date, targeted capacity payments are used. 4 Currently, a strategic reserve is implemented. 5 This refers to the now
in place “availability service” mechanism. An additional mechanism named “investment incentive” was abolished in 2016.
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Strategic reserve (Belgium/Sweden)
Both Belgium (since 2014) and Sweden (since 2003) have set up strategic re-
serves to support demand peaks during the winter season (Elia Group, 2015;
Svenska Kraftnät, 2016). In Belgium, the capacity is procured through a
competitive tendering process, in which market participants intending to
shut down capacity are obliged to participate (Hancher et al., 2015). Thus
far (until October 2017), the reserve has not been activated (Elia Group,
2017a,b). Contrary, the Swedish reserve has already been used a few times,
with yearly costs in 2013 and 2014 amounting to about 14 respectively 13 mil-
lion Euro. This is significantly lower than the estimated costs of a shortage
situation (90 million Euro) (Cejie, 2015).
Central buyer (United Kingdom)
In order to maintain generation adequacy, in 2014, the United Kingdom in-
troduced central capacity auctions with the first delivery to take place in
winter 2018/2019. The capacity payments are determined via descending
clock auctions four years (T–4) and one year (T–1) before the respective
delivery period. Despite the technology-neutral approach, the incentives for
demand response (0.4–2.5% of the contracted capacity) and new investments
(4.2–6.5%) have been limited in the first three T–4 auctions (Office of Gas
and Electricity Markets, 2015, 2016, 2017). However, in the latest T–4 auc-
tion (2016), existing and new storage capacities won contracts for the first
time, accounting for around 6% of the contracted capacity (Office of Gas
and Electricity Markets, 2017).
De-central obligation (France)
In 2015, France implemented a de-central obligation with the first delivery
to take place in 2017. All load-serving entities are obliged to hold a cer-
tain number of certificates reflecting the share of electricity consumption of
their consumers during times of peak demand, e.g., when extreme winter
conditions occur. Certificates can be obtained by certifying own generation
and demand-side capacities, which afterward can be traded in a market or
using bilateral arrangements (European Commission, 2016a). The French
mechanism is the first to explicitly include and remunerate foreign capacities
in neighboring countries, however, limited by the expected capacity of the
respective interconnectors at peak times (European Commission, 2016c). In
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the first three auctions, a total volume of 34 GW has been contracted with
all auctions resulting in capacity prices close to 10 000 EUR/MW (EPEX
SPOT, 2017a,b,c).
Targeted capacity payments (Spain)
The Spanish mechanism, initially introduced in 1997, was substantially re-
designed in 2007 to adapt to the then valid European law (Hancher et al.,
2015). The new system was designed to reduce investment risk by offering
fixed capacity payments for a period of ten years (investment incentive). Se-
curing generation adequacy in the medium-term (availability service) through
contracts of one year or less with peak-load power plants was the other main
target. However, to estimate the required generation capacity and long-term
capacity payments was made significantly more difficult by unforeseen events
like the economic crisis and the resulting low electricity demand, which to-
gether led to the reduction of long-term capacity payments for investments
in 2012 and ultimately to the abolition of the investment incentive in 2013.
Nonetheless, the availability service is still active.
3.3. Harmonization of the European electricity market
The European Commission (2011) considers a single European electricity
market—also termed “internal electricity market”—essential in order to en-
sure competitive, sustainable and secure energy supply in the future. This is
contrasted by several European countries already using or currently imple-
menting individual mechanisms to increase generation adequacy on a national
level (see Section 3.2 and Figure 4a). Yet, the uncoordinated implementa-
tion of these local mechanisms might lead to numerous potentially adverse
cross-border effects, which are described in detail in Section 4.6.
Bearing in mind the additional mechanisms that are likely to be estab-
lished within the next few years (see Figure 4b), these potential cross-border
effects are expected to further gain in importance. For this reason, Hawker
et al. (2017) suggest three different approaches in order to limit potential ad-
verse effects of national mechanisms. Firstly, generators could be permitted
to participate in CRMs in their neighboring countries taking into account
the respective interconnector capacity. Secondly, all national mechanisms
currently in operation could be harmonized and coordinated under a single
design. Thirdly, a single EU-wide CRM could be implemented. However,
although a European strategic reserve is described as technically feasible
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by Neuhoff et al. (2016), a realization of the latter two options is unlikely
and potentially also not reasonable due to different drivers for the design
of the national mechanisms11 and difficulties in defining a common VoLL
despite countries’ structural differences in terms of their economy, their en-
ergy mix and their potential risk of shortage situations (Réseau de transport
d’électricité, 2014a).
The European Commission has already recognized the issue of cross-
border effects and, thus, continuously assesses the conformity of planned
and implemented mechanisms with EU State aid rules (for an overview of
the cases see European Commission, 2017d). For a lawful public interven-
tion in the market, the European Commission (2013) requires the respective
member state to demonstrate the essential need for any capacity remunera-
tion. Moreover, any mechanism must ensure that distortions of competition
are minimized and technology neutrality is guaranteed. The latter aspect in-
cludes the eligibility of demand-side measures or foreign generation capacity,
which, for example, has led to several adjustments of the French decentralized
capacity market mechanism.
4. Impacts on efficiency and market welfare
In the following, the most significant theoretical and model-based studies
along with their key findings are reviewed. First, the design elements of
CRMs (Section 4.1) are briefly discussed. Then, it is examined how CRMs
are affected by the current characteristics of the electricity market such as
market power (Section 4.2), risk aversion (Section 4.3), and investment cycles
(Section 4.4). Subsequently, it is discussed how market welfare is influenced
by CRMs (Section 4.5) and what effects occur in neighboring market areas
(Section 4.6). Finally, the impact of CRMs in a changing electricity market
characterized by a higher share of RES (Section 4.7) and a more flexible
demand side (Section 4.8) is discussed.
For many analyses, especially for dynamic long-term effects—such as the
occurrence of investment cycles—the use of models is highly suitable (Hary
11Although the main drivers behind the implementation of a CRM are usually threats
to generation adequacy, the backgrounds may differ, e.g., while Belgium and Germany are
phasing out nuclear power and see the need to incentivize new generation capacity, France
and Sweden cope with potentially system-endangering demand peaks in winter.
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et al., 2016). Numerous different approaches already exist in the literature,




No CRM Strategic reserve Central buyer
Tender for new capacity Targeted capacity payments De-central obligation
Figure 4: Overview of a) current situation of CRMs in Europe and b) the status in the
future when all planned mechanisms are implemented. Already today, the mechanisms are
poorly coordinated, which might intensify due to additional mechanisms being established
within the next few years. Sources: ACER and CEER (2017); EirGrid plc and SONI
Limited (2017); European Commission (2014, 2016a,b); Hancher et al. (2015); Roques
et al. (2016).
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Table 5: Summarized overview of modeling approaches regarding the devel-
opment of electricity market design with a focus on capacity remuneration
mechanisms.
Publication Model typea, b Model scope Market
area
Research subject
Aalami et al. (2010) analytical interruptible technologies Iran impact of capacity market programs on
the load level and shape
Abani et al. (2018) system dynamics spot market, decommissions
(retirement of unprofitable
existing generation)/investments
hypothetical impact of risk aversion on the
performances of capacity remuneration
mechanisms (competitive EOM,
capacity market and strategic reserve)
with investors facing an uncertain peak
load
Abani et al. (2016) system dynamics spot market, decommissions
(retirement of unprofitable
existing generation)/investments
hypothetical impact of investors’ risk aversion on
investments in generation capacity in a
competitive EOM and a capacity
market
Assili et al. (2008) system dynamics electricity dispatch, investments hypothetical influence of capacity payments on







spot market, investments Texas
(ERCOT)
welfare effects of introducing capacity
payments in a competitive market and
a market with dominant firms
Bhagwat and
de Vries (2013)




effect of a strategic reserve in Germany
on investment behavior and leakage of
reserve benefits to the Netherlands
Bhagwat et al.
(2014)






cross-border impact of a capacity
market and a strategic reserve on











effectiveness strategic reserve in the
presence of a high RES share
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Table 5: Summarized overview of modeling approaches regarding the devel-
opment of electricity market design with a focus on capacity remuneration
mechanisms.












effectiveness of a capacity market in the
presence of imperfect information and
uncertainty, declining demand shocks











effectiveness of a forward capacity
market with long-term contracts in the
presence of a growing share of RES
Bhagwat et al.
(2017c)







cross-border effects of a capacity market







hypothetical efficiency of capacity payments







Germany effects of the proposed strategic reserve




system dynamics spot market, investments,
transmission constraints
hypothetical cross-border effects of an EOM




system dynamics spot market, investments hypothetical
based on
France
effects of large-scale deployment of wind









hypothetical firms’ optimal behavior and market
equilibrium in capacity markets with
the possibility to sell to a foreign
market under both perfect competition
and monopoly
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Table 5: Summarized overview of modeling approaches regarding the devel-
opment of electricity market design with a focus on capacity remuneration
mechanisms.





stochastic equilibrium electricty dispatch, investment hypothetical effects of risk (fuel prices, carbon
market) on investment decisions in
generation capacity
Fabra et al. (2011) analytical (Nash
equilibrium)
investments hypothetical effects of price caps and auction formats
(uniform-price/discriminatory) on
investments and the capacity ratio
between two firms
Fan et al. (2012) stochastic equilibrium electricity dispatch, investments hypothetical effects of uncertainty and risk aversion
on investments in high and low-carbon
capacities






effect of central buyer capacity market
on investment cycles and long-term
market stability








impact of a capacity payment
mechanism on the long-term
development of investments in
conventional capacities and on
electricity prices






short-term effects of an EOM and an
energy-plus-capacity market on
cross-border trade and efficient
allocation of transmission capacity





Germany development of security of supply under
the increasing penetration of
intermittent RES and the need for






spot market, investments Germany influence of spot market design on
firms’ investment decision for different
regimes of spot market competition
(competitive prices and Cournot-Nash
equilibrium)
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Table 5: Summarized overview of modeling approaches regarding the devel-
opment of electricity market design with a focus on capacity remuneration
mechanisms.
Publication Model typea, b Model scope Market
area
Research subject








sustainability of a central buyer




real options for single
investor
spot market, investments Europe effect of capacity payments on
investments in gas-fired power plants
under rising renewable feed-in
Hary et al. (2016) system dynamics spot market, decommissions
(retirement of unprofitable
existing generation)/investments
hypothetical dynamic effects of a capacity market




system dynamics electricity generation,
investments, operating reserve,
transmission constraints
Iran effect of a (regional) capacity payment
mechanism and a price cap on
investments in Iranian electricity
market
Herrero et al. (2015) single-firm
optimization
electricity dispatch, investments hypothetical effects of the implemented pricing rule
(linear and non-linear) on long-term
investment incentives
Hobbs et al. (2007) agent-based (single
agent)
investments hypothetical effects of alternative demand curves in
the PJM market on reserve margins,
generator profitability, and consumer
costs




Belgium effect of central buyer capacity market
and strategic reserve on the reserve









effect of a capacity mechanism or an
increased price cap on generation
capacity under rising renewable feed-in
Joskow (2008) analytical (Ramsey
optimum)








hypothetical efficiency of capacity obligations
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Table 5: Summarized overview of modeling approaches regarding the devel-
opment of electricity market design with a focus on capacity remuneration
mechanisms.
Publication Model typea, b Model scope Market
area
Research subject







Germany generation adequacy in different market
designs (EOM, central buyer capacity
market, strategic reserve)




South Korea effects of zonal forward capacity




statistical electricity dispatch Belgium occurrence of electricity shortages and
surpluses in the presence of a high share










spot market, investments hypothetical economic welfare of a central buyer






hypothetical influence of uncertainty on producer
surplus and market stability in case of
capacity payments and a capacity
auction
Léautier (2016) analytical (two-stage,
Nash equilibrium)
spot market, investments hypothetical optimal investment in different market
designs (financial reliability options,
physical capacity certificates, single
market for energy and operating
reserves)
Le Coq et al. (2017) analytical combined
with scenario
experiments
spot market, investments hypothetical relationship between prices, market
power and investment under three
different regulatory regimes (low price
cap, high price cap, capacity market)
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Table 5: Summarized overview of modeling approaches regarding the devel-
opment of electricity market design with a focus on capacity remuneration
mechanisms.












ability of three different market
mechanisms (Operating Reserve
Demand Curves, Fixed Reserve Scarcity
Prices and fixed capacity payments) to
provide generator revenue sufficiency
and resource adequacy with increasing
amounts of renewable energy
Lueken et al. (2016) statistical spot market PJM resource adequacy requirements in the
PJM market area assuming plant







(retirement based on higher
maintenance costs)/investments,
refurbishment
hypothetical impact of refurbishment under capacity




stochastic equilibrium electricity dispatch, investments hypothetical impact of incomplete risk trading
(Contracts for Difference, Reliability






spot market, investments hypothetical impact of penalty schemes for
under-delivery on capacity mechanisms’
effectiveness and unit reliability
Meunier (2013) analytical electricty dispatch, investment hypothetical effect of risk and risk-aversion on the





spot market, investments hypothetical influence of competition and market
power on market welfare of CRMs






spot market, investments Israel the rationality of underinvestment if
profit-seeking, non-abusive producers
construct and operate either one—base
or peaking—generation unit (or both)
29
Table 5: Summarized overview of modeling approaches regarding the devel-
opment of electricity market design with a focus on capacity remuneration
mechanisms.








spot market, investments hypothetical comparison of three CRM (reliability
options, forward capacity market, and
capacity payments) in regard of
efficiently assuring long-term capacity
adequacy in Cournot oligopoly,
collusion, and monopolistic situations












effects of maintaining a strategic reserve
in Finland in combination with the
different scenarios of interconnection




system dynamics electricity dispatch, investments,
transmission constraints
Switzerland impact of the nuclear phase-out and the
increasing penetration of variable RES










Europe cross-border effects (investments,
electricity generation, market prices,
and import export flows) of a unilateral
introduction of a German capacity
market
Park et al. (2007) system dynamics spot market, investments South Korea effects of capacity incentive
systems—loss of load probability or
fixed capacity payments—on investment
in the Korean electricity market






hypothetical effects of capacity mechanisms on
security of supply objectives assuming
risk-averse and risk-neutral investor
behavior in power markets undergoing
an energy transition
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Table 5: Summarized overview of modeling approaches regarding the devel-
opment of electricity market design with a focus on capacity remuneration
mechanisms.
Publication Model typea, b Model scope Market
area
Research subject







effects of cross-border congestion
management and capacity mechanisms
on welfare and generation adequacy in
Europe (potential development of the
CWE Market)
Schwenen (2014) analytical spot market hypothetical effect of market structure (duopoly with
symmetric and asymmetric firm size) on
security of supply in a capacity market
and an EOM
Schwenen (2015) analytical capacity auction New York
(ICAP)
strategic bidding to coordinate on an
equilibrium in multi-unit auctions with
capacity constrained bidders




hypothetical reinforcing cross-border competition for
the supply of capacity generation with
the help of a flow-based forward
capacity mechanism
Tashpulatov (2015) log-linear regression spot market England and
Wales
effects of regulatory reforms on











effects of capacity remuneration
mechanisms on welfare and distribution
(consumers/producers) with a focus on
conventional power plants
de Vries and Heijnen
(2008)





effectiveness of different market designs
(an EOM with and without market
power, capacity payment, operating
reserves pricing, capacity market) under
uncertainty about demand growth
Weiss et al. (2017) hybrid (single-firm
optimization/agent-
based)
spot market, investments Israel market prices, reliability, and consumer
costs in different market designs (EOM,
capacity market, strategic reserve)
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Table 5: Summarized overview of modeling approaches regarding the devel-
opment of electricity market design with a focus on capacity remuneration
mechanisms.





analytical spot market, investment Germany effects of an increasing number of
derivatives on welfare and investment
incentives in electricity market with risk
averse firms
Winzer (2013) agent-based spot market, investments Great
Britain
robustness of various capacity












effects of a capacity market and
strategic reserve on investments and
electricity prices
a Here, the column “model scope” excludes all CRM as these are mentioned in the column “Research subject”. b If only marginal costs are regarded to determine, which
capacity is operating, the term “electricity dispatch” is used. However, the term “spot market” is used if the strategic behavior of market participants is explicitly modeled.32
4.1. Generic design criteria for a capacity
remuneration mechanism
The design of a CRM is a complex challenge where the ideal solution
depends on the particular market conditions, e.g., the existing capacity mix
and the demand characteristics (Batlle and Rodilla, 2010; Cepeda and Finon,
2011; Keppler, 2017; Spees et al., 2013). Thus, in the following paragraphs,
the major design elements12 of CRMs are discussed.
Target for system availability
Once the decision to introduce a CRM has been made, a system-wide target
for system adequacy is often set, which helps to determine in the case of
volume-based mechanisms the required capacity level or in the case of price-
based mechanisms the targeted capacity price (Hogan, 2017). Here, the loss
of load expectation (LOLE)13 is frequently used and often a value of 1 day
in 10 years is targeted (NERC, 2009), which however has been criticized
as arbitrary and too strict to be economically optimal (Cramton and Stoft,
2006). Taking into account correlated outages among generators and the
expected future demand, then the required quantity of demand to reach the
target for system availability is derived.
Demand Curve
In quantity-based CRMs, a demand curve—usually referred to as the variable
resource requirement demand curve—must be defined that sets the price for
each capacity level.14 Although in theory, it makes sense to rely on the
12At this point only the most important design parameters as well as selected parameters
for specific mechanisms can be discussed, for further criteria, e.g., see Batlle and Pérez-
Arriaga (2008); Ausubel and Cramton (2010) for different design criteria, Herrero et al.
(2015) for pricing rules, Neuhoff et al. (2016) for the design of a strategic reserve or
Schwenen (2015) for the design of capacity auctions.
13However, the LOLE is not free of criticism, for example, as it refers only to curtailment
and does not indicate to what absolute or relative extent in relation to the market size the
curtailment occurs. Here, the unserved energy (UE) metric provides more insight (Lueken
et al., 2016). An overview of further reliability target can be found at Milligan et al.
(2016).
14Instead of demand curves sometimes a fixed capacity is set. However, Hobbs et al.
(2007) advise against this practice as sloped demand curves bear lower risks for consumers.
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declining marginal value of capacity (Cramton and Stoft, 2007), in practice,
due to the difficulty of estimating this value, usually, a linear curve based
on an upper and a lower price limit is used (Spees et al., 2013). The upper
price cap needs to be high enough to incentivize sufficient investments when
the system is tight and typically equals a multiple of the Net CONE15. The
lower price cap is usually set equal to zero and marks the capacity level when
the desired reserve margin is reached. However, sometimes, in order to avoid
a total price collapse or prevent market manipulation from large purchasers
of capacity, a higher price is set, e.g., 75% of the Net CONE (Miller et al.,
2012). When setting the upper and lower price limit, it also needs to be taken
into account that a steep demand curve may lead to more volatile prices and,
thus, greater uncertainty for investors (Bhagwat et al., 2017b).
Eligible Technologies
In a next step, the definition of the capacity product needs to be established,
and it has to be decided which capacity resources are eligible. De Sisternes
and Parsons (2016) argue that CRMs should be technology-neutral and al-
low for the participation of all elements that can reliably provide capacity
(conventional and renewable generation, storage technologies, demand-side
measures). If certain technologies were to be excluded, the mechanisms would
introduce hidden subsidies for the technologies eligible for the CRM, which
in turn would lead to higher costs for consumers. At the same time, how-
ever, it must be noted that this can possibly lead to conflicts regarding the
reduction of carbon emissions, for example, in Great Britain highly emission-
intensive diesel-fueled generators received capacity payments (S&P Global
Platts, 2015). Moreover, Hach and Spinler (2016) propose to consider the
specific policy targets and only consider a technology-neutral selection if gen-
eration adequacy is to be achieved at the lowest possible cost. However, if
particularly flexible capacities are required or an ambitious emission reduc-
tion target needs to be achieved, this should be reflected in the selection of
15Similar to the determination of the VoLL, the determination of the CONE or the Net
CONE, which is usually carried out by the regulator, is also a controversial matter. The
choice or the cost-basis of the reference technology, and, thus, its value is often adjusted
over time (Cramton and Stoft, 2007, 2008; Jenkin et al., 2016). Regarding the related
uncertainty, Spees et al. (2013) propose to better set a higher value to avoid unreliable
outcomes.
34
technologies. Although it is cheaper to only pay for new generation capac-
ities, it must be noted that this strategy works only once as investors will
adjust their behavior onwards and demand additional protection and risk
premiums (Cramton et al., 2013).
Verification system
In order to enhance the performance of CRMs, a performance incentive sys-
tem is required, which ensures that the capacities actually provide the con-
tracted capacity when the system is tight (Vazquez et al., 2002; Mastropietro
et al., 2016). This can either be implemented through a financial penalty for
non-compliance (Cramton and Stoft, 2005) or by restricting the amount a re-
source can provide to its firm capacity (Batlle and Pérez-Arriaga, 2008). The
experiences from the United States show that despite the existence of explicit
penalties, underperformance has occurred, which underlines the importance
of designing and implementing a performance incentive system (Mastropietro
et al., 2017). If a financial penalty is chosen, it needs to be high enough to
incite investors to compliance, which, however, increases the risk of investors
and this is reflected in their bids. For the exact amount of the penalty, it is
possible to rely on the VoLL, the capacity price or the Net CONE.
4.2. Potential and effects of market power
Central buyer mechanism, e.g., reliability options, are able to lower the
potential for market power in wholesale electricity markets (Le Coq et al.,
2017; Léautier, 2016) and thereby improve the efficiency and reduce the to-
tal bill of generation, which is defined as the sum of the revenues realized
by the electricity generators (Hach et al., 2016). By contrast, compared to
an EOM, Bhagwat et al. (2016a) claim that a strategic reserve increases the
possibility to exercise market power as the opportunities to withhold capac-
ities, which can result in an activation of the reserve and extreme market
prices, become more frequent compared to an EOM where market power is
primarily exercised during capacity shortage hours.
In addition, as Mohamed Haikel (2011) points out, market power might
be exerted when introducing non-market based mechanisms, e.g., capacity
payments. However, the possible entry of a new competitor makes them less
vulnerable to market power than, e.g., day-ahead markets, where in the short
term no additional competition can emerge (Schwenen, 2014). Therefore, it
seems unlikely that the additional potential of market power within a CRM
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will compensate for the lower potential in the wholesale markets. Nonethe-
less, Joskow (2008) advocates that the capacity price could be reduced by
the quasi-rents earned by a hypothetical peaking unit, thereby disincentiviz-
ing the exercise of market power. Furthermore, Cramton and Stoft (2008)
argue that only new investments could be allowed to set the capacity price
to mitigate market power, existing capacity must either submit a zero bid
or is not allowed to participate at all. The rationale behind this approach is
that although established market players might possess market power, they
are unable to exercise it if there is competitive new entry and only new
investments set the price.
4.3. Influence of uncertainty and risk aversion
In the majority of the considered analyses, it is assumed for simplification
purposes that all decision-makers act risk-neutral, although several theoret-
ical arguments (Neuhoff and de Vries, 2004; Banal-Estanol and Ottaviani,
2006) as well as real-world observations suggest that decision-makers in the
energy sector are usually risk-averse or at least behave accordingly (Meunier,
2013). This seems to be the case not only for economic but also for political
decision-makers (Finon et al., 2008; Neuhoff et al., 2016). However, several
studies explicitly consider risk-aversion and their findings are described in
the following.
As the electricity market reacts very sensitively to the level of risk aver-
sion of the investors (e.g., Petitet et al., 2017), risk aversion causes the market
to deviate from the installed capacity in the welfare optimal case (Winzer,
2013). Given the high social costs of capacity shortages and the uncertainty
associated with the development of the electricity market, De Vries and Hei-
jnen (2008) point out that the socially optimal level of generation capacity
is higher than the theoretical optimum under perfect foresight. Moreover,
Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011) find that in an EOM with a low price cap as
well as in a CRM, uncertainty and risk aversion aggravates the generation
adequacy problem, which in turn can dramatically increase the costs for end
consumers. This is caused by delaying investments and shifting from high- to
less-capital intensive investments. Similar findings are made by de Vries and
Heijnen (2008) who state that CRMs can contribute to a more balanced gen-
eration portfolio by reducing the investment risk and, thus, counteracting the
tendency of risk-averse investors towards low-capital technologies with short
lead times. Fan et al. (2012) conclude that a CRM could prove to be bene-
ficial as their findings indicate that risk aversion tempts investors to adopt
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the decisions that would have been taken if the worst-case scenario had ma-
terialized thereby avoiding investments in new uncertain technologies, e.g.,
concentrating solar power.
As part of an analytical analysis, Neuhoff and de Vries (2004) investigate
the influence of weather- and demand-related uncertainty and risk aversion
on the investment decisions of electricity generators having a unique tech-
nology at their disposal. Their results indicate that an EOM will provide
insufficient investment incentives to ensure generation adequacy if investors
or final consumers are risk-averse and unable to hedge their portfolio ade-
quately via long-term contracts. De Maere d’Aertrycke et al. (2017) analyze
the effect of two reference long-term contracts as well as the impact of a
long-term forward capacity market and find that even though long-term con-
tracts and a highly calibrated forward capacity market are able to improve
welfare substantially, they also entail severe drawbacks. In all cases, traded
volumes need to be far higher than in current energy markets as illiquidity
can severely impair the effectiveness of these instruments and increase the
risk premiums demanded by investors by about 10%. Besides, Willems and
Morbee (2010) find that the liquid trade of derivatives provides sufficient in-
centives for a risk-averse producer to invest. Here, forward contracts mainly
lead to an increase of investments in base-load capacity, and if also options
are offered in the market, the investments in peak-load plants will increase
as well. In some cases, if no suitable financial substitutes are traded for an
investment option, however, overinvestment can occur.
Furthermore, Abani et al. (2016) state that considering the risk aversion
of the decision makers involved is crucial when comparing different market
designs. Their results demonstrate that when comparing the implementa-
tion of a central buyer mechanism and an EOM, the difference in shortage
situations increases if investors are regarded as risk-averse instead of risk-
neutral. In a more recent study, Abani et al. (2018) investigate an EOM
and two CRMs (central buyer, strategic reserve) and find that in case of risk
aversion, investors tend to extend the lifetime of existing generation capacity
instead of building new, which in turn leads to higher total generation costs.
Similarly, Petitet et al. (2017) show that in an EOM the amount of eco-
nomically motivated decommissions of thermal plants or the level of scarcity
prices is dependent on the risk aversion of the investors. However, CRMs
are comparatively insensitive to the risk aversion of the market participants
due to the fact that the required quantity is directly specified by the regula-
tor and the risk aversion of the market participants is reflected in their bids
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affecting the total costs. This proves to be a substantial benefit for policy
makers as market developments are more predictable.
4.4. Effects of investment cycles
Although fixed or variable capacity payments are unable to abolish in-
vestment cycles, they reduce the cycles’ amplitude resulting in a high level
of market price stability and a reasonable reserve margin (Assili et al., 2008;
Ford, 1999). Moreover, Cepeda and Finon (2011) demonstrate that invest-
ment cycles can effectively be dampened by capacity obligations, in turn
leading to smoother annual average electricity prices and higher reliability.
In case of a strategic reserve, Bhagwat et al. (2016a) and de Sisternes and
Parsons (2016) find that investment cycles, e.g., caused by uncertainty about
the future electricity demand, may still occur. Similarly, Hary et al. (2016)
show that although underinvestment is avoided, overinvestment is not pre-
vented by a strategic reserve as the regulator cannot influence the perceived
value of additional generation capacity or enforce investors to postpone their
decisions. However, a central buyer mechanism is able to positively influence
investor behavior and, therefore, reduce the occurrences of under- and over-
investment. Moreover, Bhagwat et al. (2017a) find that in case of a forward
capacity market boom and bust cycles may still occur if the electricity de-
mand drops sharply, consequently leading to the decline of capacity prices
and multiple decommissions of existing capacity so that only a high reserve
margin initially set by the regulator prevents loss of load situations. In reac-
tion to the resulting shortage, capacity prices spike again, and investments
are made. Similarly, Bhagwat et al. (2017b) state that in a forward capacity
market investment cycles still exist, but in comparison with an EOM, they
extend over longer periods and feature smaller amplitudes. Also, by decreas-
ing the investor risk and reliability risk for consumers, forward reliability
markets can prevent boom-bust cycles (Cramton and Stoft, 2008).
Beyond, Franco et al. (2015) claim that the implementation of a CRM
together with long-term contracts for low-carbon generators prevent any fluc-
tuations in the price and reserve margin in the British electricity market.
However, sudden shocks seem not to be taken into account in the analysis.
Also, Hasani and Hosseini (2011) state that a hybrid CRM (periodically us-
ing capacity payments and a forward capacity market) is able to prevent
over- and underinvestment efficiently.
In summary, the presented results support the assertion that investment
cycles, which are caused by uncertainties, e.g., regarding the demand growth,
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can be damped by CRMs (de Vries and Heijnen, 2008). However, most often
they cannot be completely prevented and a sufficient reserve margin mainly
depending on market uncertainties needs to be determined by the regulator.
4.5. Efficiency and market welfare of capacity
remuneration mechanisms
As a strategic reserve allows the use of all contracted capacities only for
a single purpose, inevitably inefficiencies occur, and additional investments
are needed to replace the lost flexibility (Höschle et al., 2017). Further,
the dispatch of the strategic reserve at any other value than the VoLL can
reduce the market welfare analogous to the price caps in the EOM (Finon
et al., 2008). Besides, a strategic reserve does not appear to improve the
market stability or increase the expected economic surplus in the long term
(Lara-Arango et al., 2017a). Therefore, it seems advisable to use a strategic
reserve as a short-term solution and replace it by other mechanisms in the
long term. However, the distributional effects of strategic reserve seem to be
relatively small (Neuhoff et al., 2016).
Creti and Fabra (2007) state that in order for a CRM to maximize so-
cial welfare, gains from reducing load loss situations must exceed the ad-
ditional capacity costs and the secured capacity procured should be equal
to the peak demand. Furthermore, they argue that the price limit should
be defined as the opportunity costs of providing full capacity commitment
as different parameterizations would lead to a reduction in welfare through
either overcapacities or scarcity prices. In a case study for Great Britain,
Hach et al. (2016) find that through deliberate overcapacity and, thereby,
avoiding extreme prices and lost load occasions, a central buyer mechanism
can effectively lower the total bill of generation. Similar results are obtained
by Bhagwat et al. (2017b), Höschle et al. (2017), and Keles et al. (2016) in
case studies of the electricity market in Great Britain, Belgium, and Ger-
many respectively. However, Schwenen (2014) argues that in a framework
with two firms, in equilibrium capacity prices are non-competitive due to
capacity constraints and signals for the entry of new firms are likely being
distorted by the regulator.
By employing an analytical model, Briggs and Kleit (2013) find that ca-
pacity payments for base-load power plants are never optimal. In the short
term, capacity payments will cause prices to fall and competitive base-load
power plants to be suppressed, and in the long term incentives to invest
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in peak load power plants and generation adequacy will decline. Also, the
positive short-term price effect might be lower than theoretically expected
(Genoese et al., 2012), and the payments might even fail to ensure an ad-
equate reserve margin (Park et al., 2007; Kim and Kim, 2012). Likewise,
Milstein and Tishler (2012) find that targeted capacity payments for the
peaking technology, which account for 25% of the associated capacity costs,
only increase the social welfare by 0.02%. Furthermore, Bajo-Buenestado
(2017) show that the benefit of capacity payments depends on the intensity
of competition and is less if the market is controlled by dominant companies
as in many real-world markets. Joskow and Tirole (2007) state that if market
power is present in a market with more than two states of nature, i.e., peak
and off-peak, capacity payments are an insufficient instrument.
As results from the literature are not always coherent and often only
applicable for specific cases, the question of which CRM is most efficient re-
mains open. For example, often a central buyer mechanism seems to yield
significantly better results than a strategic reserve (Hary et al., 2016; Keles
et al., 2016; Höschle et al., 2017), but sometimes the results are ambiguous
(Traber, 2017). Most likely, this can be attributed to the fact that the re-
sults depend among other things on the existing generation structure and
their development in time (Batlle and Rodilla, 2010; Traber, 2017) as well as
the taken assumptions, e.g., the consideration of uncertainty (Lara-Arango
et al., 2017b) or the risk aversion of investors (Petitet et al., 2017). Never-
theless, there seems to be a consensus in the literature that market-based
mechanisms are usually advantageous compared to interventionist mecha-
nisms, e.g., capacity payments (Batlle and Rodilla, 2010; Mohamed Haikel,
2011; Lara-Arango et al., 2017a).
4.6. Influence on neighboring countries through
cross-border effects
One of the difficulties encountered in the study of cross-border effects is
the large number of influence factors such as the regarded markets, gener-
ation technologies, different interconnector capacities or asymmetric market
sizes. Furthermore, cross-border effects are strongly influenced by competi-
tion between market participants and the possibility of exerting market power
(Meyer and Gore, 2015). Thus, deriving common conclusions is extremely
challenging.
One major short-term cross-border effect is the occurrence of market dis-
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tortions if a CRM does not adequately consider generation capacities abroad.
In this case, through additional capacity payments, domestic producers gain
a competitive edge over foreign producers (Hawker et al., 2017). However,
the primary focus of the scientific research is on long-term effects, i.e., the
development of generation adequacy, distributive effects, and price effects,
as CRMs will mainly drive investment decisions (e.g., Ozdemir et al., 2013).
For example, with the help of an agent-based electricity market model Bhag-
wat et al. (2014, 2017c) find that in case of a forward capacity market and
strategic reserve in two neighboring markets, the forward capacity market
appears to have a negative spillover effect on the strategic reserve. However,
a neighboring EOM does not limit the ability of a national forward capacity
market or strategic reserve to achieve its objectives. Indeed, vice versa, two
effects can be observed. On the one hand, the neighboring EOM operates
as a free-rider and benefits from the additional foreign generation capaci-
ties. On the other hand, the dependence of the EOM on imports increases,
which can be particularly disadvantageous in critical situations. Similar re-
sults are obtained by Ochoa and Gore (2015), who show in a case study
for the Finnish and Russian electricity market, that if Russian imports were
reliably available, abolishing Finland’s strategic reserve could lead to lower
costs for Finnish consumers. However, as this is not the case, the advan-
tages of maintaining a strategic reserve outweigh the disadvantages, and the
interconnection expansion should be avoided—instead, the development of
local capacities should be given preference. Furthermore, Cepeda and Finon
(2011) find that in the long-term an EOM will only marginally benefit from a
CRM in an adjacent market. Also, for the EOM, the unilateral introduction
of a price cap leads to a reduced level of security of supply as suppliers prefer
to offer their generation capacity in neighboring markets. Moreover, by using
a simulation model to investigate the unilateral introduction of a strategic
reserve and reliability options in a two-country case, Meyer and Gore (2015)
show that the overall cross-border welfare effect is most likely negative.
In addition, it can be concluded that the introduction of a CRM in a
neighboring country creates considerable pressure on the national regulator
to introduce a dedicated CRM as a safeguard against possibly harmful con-
sequences (Bhagwat et al., 2017c; Gore et al., 2016). Therefore, Hawker
et al. (2017) are advocating the cross-border coordination of CRMs to pro-
vide sufficient new investment in generation and transmission capacities and
Neuhoff et al. (2016) claim that a coordinated strategic reserve in Europe
should be feasible and, among other things, would have the following ad-
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vantages: On the one hand, capacities from abroad could be used at times
of maximum stress and, on the other hand, the joint calculation of the re-
serve volume would reduce the required quantity as individual demand peaks
usually occur at different times. Furthermore, with the possible expansion
of cross-border capacity and the associated strong influence on prices (Oso-
rio and van Ackere, 2016), a coordinated approach seems to be increasingly
advantageous. However, solving the dilemma of choosing between a coordi-
nated or national approach is complex. Especially when time is a critical
factor, a co-ordinated solution might not be implemented early enough due
to the increased need for coordination (de Vries, 2007).
4.7. Impact of a high share of intermittent renewables
One of the central questions associated with the rapid expansion of RES
is whether they exacerbate the adequacy problem. First of all, Cramton
et al. (2013) point out that price caps present in most EOMs are unaffected
as the level is neither lowered nor increased by RES. Nonetheless, increasing
low price caps might become more relevant as large investments in peak-load
generation capacity are likely to be required as a backup for intermittent
RES. However, this could be prevented by a price cap set too low (Cepeda
and Finon, 2013; Jaehnert and Doorman, 2014).
As RES, due to their marginal costs close to zero, can be regarded as
a price-inelastic demand—with the exception of situations where the prices
are negative—Cramton et al. (2013) argue that RES increase the volatility
of and the uncertainty about the demand and market prices and, thereby,
exacerbate the adequacy problem. Similarly, Newbery (2017) claims that
a high share of intermittent RES, on the one hand, and the uncertainty
about the development of the carbon allowances price, on the other hand,
likely require long-term capacity contracts—beyond a horizon of three to four
years—for ensuring reliability efficiently.
Jaehnert and Doorman (2014) investigate the development of system ade-
quacy and find that the capacity reserve margins decrease with an increasing
share of RES leading to several occurrences of load curtailment. Also, the
merit-order effect caused by large-scale employment of wind energy is more
relevant in an EOM than in a market with a CRM, where thermal genera-
tion capacities are better able to recover the fixed costs of their investment
(Cepeda and Finon, 2013). However, in reverse, a CRM that only takes
into account the secured available capacity can have a negative impact on
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the market-driven development of wind power. Still, in a world with 100%
renewable energy, Weiss et al. (2017) argue that an EOM can adequately
function if market prices take into account the opportunity costs of flexible
resources. However, in such a scenario, RES probably still require a dedi-
cated funding mechanism. Besides, a CRM might be necessary to minimize
the associated risk of underinvestment in flexible capacities.
4.8. Incentives for flexible resources
As with increasing shares of RES supply fluctuations in the electricity
market become more frequent, flexible resources are required (Nicolosi, 2010;
Grave et al., 2012), e.g., demand-side management or short-term and long-
term storage options that have not yet been sufficiently remunerated in the
market design to date (Cepeda and Finon, 2013; Joskow, 2008). An ade-
quate market design needs to pay sufficient attention to flexible resources in
order to fully capitalize on their potential (Neuhoff et al., 2016; Weiss et al.,
2017). Although flexible resources do not automatically guarantee a reliable
level of investment, they ensure reliability under different levels of installed
generation capacity and induce an efficient electricity dispatch (Cramton and
Stoft, 2005).
Whereas the concept of firm or reliable capacity is already well defined
and, moreover, constant, regardless of how the future electricity system devel-
ops, the term flexibility is still vague and furthermore has a critical temporal
dependency. Sometimes flexibility is required for a few seconds or minutes,
but other times for several hours or even days and usually the most suitable
options for short-term flexibility are not coherent with those for long-term
flexibility (Hogan, 2017). In order to reliably determine the need for and
value of flexibility, it is best to compare the value of energy in scarcity with
that in abundance situations, which depends on the current state of the
electricity system.
In a well-functioning EOM, market participants are exposed to extremely
high price signals at times of scarcity or negative prices in times of oversupply,
thus, creating incentives for long-term investments in storage technologies as
well as incentives for consumers to directly react to price developments (e.g.,
Hu et al., 2017). For this reason, EOMs can especially benefit from increased
flexibility, e.g., through demand response, as the market is then able to react
to extreme price peaks and consumers are no longer exposed to the excessive
market power of suppliers, thereby reducing the need for regulatory price
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caps (Schwenen, 2014). Yet, if the market design is severely different, e.g.,
by a forward capacity market, price spikes will decrease in frequency and
amplitude, thus, diminishing the value of flexible resources (Hogan, 2017).
Auer and Haas (2016) even argue that the introduction of capacity payments
ruins market competition, meaning that flexibility options would not be ex-
ploited, thus, leaving their development only in the hands of the regulator.
Even though these theoretical findings pose a clear disadvantage for CRMs,
practical experiences indicate that decision makers seem to be aware of this
issue as, for example in the USA, CRMs explicitly include financial support
for flexible resources, which in turn lead to a rise of these capacities (Rious
et al., 2015).
5. Conclusions and policy implications
Electricity markets are in many respects similar to most other markets;
however, they require a specific regulatory framework due to a number of pe-
culiarities such as the physical characteristics of the commodity electricity, an
inelastic volatile demand and the missing-money problem. In combination
with the ongoing transformation from a centralized system with primarily
fossil-fuel power plants to a decentralized system with a high share of re-
newable energies and the sharp decline in electricity prices, concerns among
policy makers about generation adequacy have grown and led to the imple-
mentation of various CRMs. However, the necessity of CRMs remains the
subject of ongoing discussion, and it is often argued that an EOM already
offers an efficient solution whereas CRMs tend to be inefficient. To better
grasp the arguments of both sides, afterward, an up-to-date overview of the
debate was given. Subsequently, a classification of the different mechanisms
was shown, the current status of implementation in Europe was presented,
and initial experiences were discussed.
Although CRMs can improve generation adequacy, they also bring with
them new challenges. One major advantage of CRMs is that they are able to
effectively reduce or even to solve different problems of existing markets. For
example, fluctuations caused by investment cycles can be dampened—even
though usually not fully abolished—and, thereby, extreme scarcity events
can be prevented. Also, the adverse effects of the abuse of market power
can be mitigated, and some mechanisms, for example, a forward capacity
market, are able to solve the missing money problem. Also, CRMs usually
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make market developments less dependent on the risk profile of the investors,
thereby, making them more predictable and reducing deviations from the
long-term optimum that can be caused by risk-averse decision-makers.
Determining the optimal market design, however, remains a complex chal-
lenge. As the adequate design depends on a variety of factors such as the
existing capacity mix and demand characteristics, no general advantageous-
ness of single mechanisms could be determined so far. For example, often
a central buyer mechanism seems to yield significantly better results than a
strategic reserve, which is inefficient by design as contracted capacities are
used for a single purpose only. However, in exceptional cases the results
are ambiguous. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that market-based mech-
anisms, e.g., a forward capacity market, are usually advantageous compared
to interventionist mechanisms such as capacity payments.
Furthermore, the implementation of a CRM can lead to market distor-
tions, e.g., through cross-border effects. Even though the cross-border im-
pacts of CRMs are complex and sometimes unambiguous, there seems to be a
consensus that a one-sided implementation leads to negative spillover effects
on a neighboring market without a CRM, which thereby increase the pres-
sure to either introduce an own CRM or to chose a coordinated approach.
Compared to an EOM, the value of flexible resources that is closely related
to volatile prices is diminished in the presence of a CRM. Therefore, their
expansion is largely independent of market forces and left in the hands of the
regulator.
Even though a large number of studies has already been carried out, the
comparability of the results is often limited and, thus, it is difficult to select
the best mechanism to implement. It would therefore be helpful if common
criteria or specific scenarios are used to evaluate different market designs.
Furthermore, especially the efficiency of the mechanism is all too often ne-
glected. Also, the behavior of market participants as learning, risk-averse
agents that interact with each other often does not seem to be adequately
addressed and rarely verified by studies or experiments. However, as the
investors’ risk profile can directly influence the results and the relative ad-
vantageousness of different CRM, it would thus be advisable to explicitly
consider risk aversion.
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